Belt and Road Initiative: A Civilisational Perspective - Part 1

 Saurav Sarmah

Based on the lecture “Belt and Road Initiative: Chinese Perspectives and Indian Options” presented in Forum for Integrated National Security (FINS) Young Strategists’ Summit 2017 (Western Region) held on 14-15 July 2017 at The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Vadodara, Gujarat.

Published as “Belt and Road Initiative: A Civilisational Perspective – Part 1”, FINS Website, Mumbai, 22 May 2018. 

https://finsindia.org/belt-road-initiative/ 

(Re-published) FINS Journal of Strategy and Diplomacy, 13 February 2019, 2 (2). ISSN 2581-6586 
https://finsindia.org/journal/belt-and-road-initiative-a-civilisation-perspective-part-1/

Introduction

China and India are two ancient, continuous civilisations. They survived the onslaughts of invaders through the last millennium and although imperialism ravaged and impoverished them, they ‘stood up’ again in the 1940s. They experimented with imported economic models of Marxism and Fabian socialism respectively for a considerable period, but have emerged as important economic powers in the 21^st century, after unleashing the entrepreneurial genius of their people. China got a head start over India as she adopted ‘reform and opening up’ policy in 1978, while India pursued liberalisation only from 1991. In 2018, China is the second largest economy in the world with more than 11 trillion dollar Gross Domestic Product (GDP), far ahead of India at approx. 2.25 trillion dollar. The new wealth provides China with an opportunity, before India catches up, to establish the predominance of her civilisation in Asia. Another divergence between the two countries is that China adopted a totalitarian system of Communist Party-state in 1949 and India became a parliamentary democracy in 1947. As a result, China has been brutally efficient in implementation of her policies and in crisis management, while India takes more time in building a political consensus on any policy or crisis, accommodating diverse points of views.

After 1978, the Chinese grand strategy has been a combination of ancient wisdom, old-style realpolitik and mercantilism and authoritarian capitalism. The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is a new component of this grand strategy. It was announced by the head of the Chinese Party-state, President Xi Jinping in 2013 and has emerged as the biggest foreign policy project of China till date. It is inspired by the ancient Eurasian trade route called by historians as Silk Road that connected China, India, Persia and Rome and the maritime expeditions of Chinese Admiral Zheng He between 1405 and 1433. Therefore, it has two dimensions: one continental, Silk Road Economic Belt and one maritime, 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. In 2016, OBOR was renamed as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The first summit meeting of Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation was held on 14-15 May 2017, attended by 30 heads of state and government.

BRI incorporates various existing infrastructure linkage projects of China with other countries and it is not something that is being built from scratch. The Belt consists of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. China is investing in roads and railways, oil and gas exploration and pipelines and port development, e.g. Gwadar, Pakistan. The Road includes strategic and commercial activities in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean as well as Polar Silk Road in partnership with Russia to explore the Arctic Sea. These large projects, requiring hundreds of billions of dollars, are supported by newly created financial institutions like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund, besides the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China.

China’s Grand Strategy and Civilisational Ambitions

In the Chinese language, China is called中国 (Zhōngguó) or the Middle Kingdom. In civilisational terms, it means that China is at the centre of the world, emphasising the superiority of Chinese civilisation and centrality of nationalism to her domestic and foreign policies, despite Marxist doctrines that consider civilisation and nationalism as false consciousness. The ancient Sino-centric order, called天下 (Tiānxià) or All Under Heaven, divided the world into three parts – the Middle Kingdom, the tributaries and the barbarians (Kissinger 2011). The countries that accepted the superiority of the Chinese order by offering homage and gifts to the Chinese emperor, also called the Son of Heaven, were given the status of tributaries. They received benefits of trade and non-aggression from China. However, the countries antagonistic to the Chinese order were considered serious threats by China and were termed as barbarians. Chinese military strategies have always been oriented towards countering threats from the barbarians (Johnston 1995). The Communist Party-state does not disown this civilisational understanding of international relations (IR).

In the contemporary context, the discourse on hierarchical international order based on civilisation seems politically incorrect. Nevertheless, mainstream IR theory also contains terms such as unipolar moment, hegemonic stability, regional hegemon, great powers and spheres of influence. Only difference is that these terms denote superiority of military- economic hard power, not civilisational soft power, while the Chinese concept of power, measured by Comprehensive National Power (CNP), denotes hard as well as soft power (Pillsbury 2000). The last four decades of China’s economic rise has not been devoid of the civilisational or soft power element. It has been accompanied by the Sinicisation process in Asia, i.e. increase of China’s ability to influence other countries (Katzenstein 2012). Thus, emergence of China as the predominant power in Asia does not only mean reordering of power structure but also civilisational transformation from Westernisation to Sinicisation (Katzenstein 2012).

Besides the international dimension, China’s grand strategy also has a domestic dimension, viz. continual economic growth and political stability, ensuring legitimacy of the Party-state. Unlike democratic systems, in which legitimacy of the government is based on periodic, free and fair elections and peaceful transfer of power if the government is defeated, the Party-state system in China gets its legitimacy from the awe and reverence of the people. Since ancient times, the Chinese state has stood for certain virtues, viz. truth, benevolence and glory, which legitimise its existence (Shue 2004). But whenever the state has been unable to sustain these virtues, due to natural calamities, foreign aggression or incompetence of the ruling dynasty, there have been rebellions, which have led to end of the dynasty and emergence of new dynasties. Ultimately one of them has succeeded in reuniting China. This concept is called the Mandate of Heaven. ‘The empire long united must divide, long divided must unite; this is how it has always been’ (Romance of the Three Kingdoms).

If we envision a civilisational continuity, we can say that the Communist Party is the latest dynasty to unite and rule China. Parallels can be drawn between the ancient virtues of truth, benevolence and glory and the Communist Party-state’s emphasis on control over information, economic growth and nationalism (Shue 2004). Firstly, like any totalitarian regime, the Communist Party seeks to control the thought process of the citizens by censorship, propaganda and education system. The majority of Chinese people do not have access to information on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre because there is heavy-handed censorship by the Party-state on internet, press, TV, radio and any other means of communication. Even a peaceful religious sect like the Falun Gong was banned in 1999 and its followers persecuted, as any alternative version of truth is not allowed to become too popular. Similarly, other religions are also restricted. Secondly, the Chinese political system has been sustained by her unprecedented economic growth that has brought abundance to the people, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty in a few decades. The stability of the Party-state regime depends on its capability to ensure sustainable prosperity through employment opportunities and rise in household incomes. Finally, the Communist Party has to ensure the national glory of China as a great power, independent of any foreign domination and with ability to influence other countries, especially in the neighbourhood. In the nationalist discourse, the US and Japan are the biggest external threats to China and separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are the internal threats. The Party-state cannot compromise on these threat perceptions due to popular sentiment, indeed has encouraged nationalist public demonstrations against these threats.

Meanwhile, the head of the Party-state President Xi Jinping has concentrated more and more power into his hands after he came to office in 2012-13. Recently, he has been reappointed as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 2017 and President of China in 2018. The 1982 Constitution of China has also been amended to remove the two-term limit on the President. He also legitimises his preponderance through truth (anti-corruption campaign), economic growth (above 6% GDP growth per annum) and nationalism (South China Sea). The anti-corruption campaign has been used by Xi to weaken his rivals from all three factions of the Communist Party, viz. Shanghai clique (led by former President Jiang Zemin), Tuanpai or Communist Youth League faction (led by former President Hu Jintao) and princelings (children of Communist Party veterans). Xi Jinping himself is a princeling. Some important persons prosecuted for corruption are Zhou Yongkang (former head of internal security under Jiang Zemin), Ling Jihua (former chief political advisor to Hu Jintao) and Bo Xilai (a popular princeling and former Party secretary of Chongqing). Through his campaign, Xi has tried to legitimise his rule as a custodian of truth and emerged as the paramount leader of China.

Thus, the multifaceted nature of China’s grand strategy can be understood to be a combination of international and domestic dimensions and economic and political considerations.

Multiple dimensions of BRI

1. International order: Through BRI, China intends to gain strategic foothold in all parts of Eurasia and Africa. She has built massive infrastructural assets in many countries. Chinese companies, technicians and workers have strong presence in these countries, as more and more projects are contracted to China. Some countries, e.g. Sri Lanka in Hambantota port development project, have fallen into debt trap, unable to repay China on her investments and have had to lease their assets to China. In this way, China is emerging as the predominant economic player in most countries of Eurasia and Africa, replacing the United States, European Union, Japan or India. China is already ahead of others, as a manufacturing hub and exporter, but BRI will allow her to become also the predominant investor and eventually banker of the world. As China becomes the centre of the world economy, through Sinicisation process, the global narrative can be changed to favour Chinese values. With China replacing others as the leading economy in the region, the narrative on democracy and human rights would be supplanted by that on the superiority of authoritarian capitalism, especially in many small, developing countries. It would be a modern Sino-centric international order.

2. Regional influence: Since ancient times, China has developed policies on her neighbourhood based on the tributary-barbarian dichotomy. Applying the dichotomy in context of the responses to BRI, we can understand China’s influence in different regions. In Northeast Asia, despite very close economic engagement, China does not have much leverage due to strong regional powers – Japan and South Korea, her relations with them turn sour from time to time due to territorial disputes or legacy of World War II with the former and North Korea with both. North Korea has assumed a posture of intractability, with her nuclear weapons programme and nuclear and missile testing, which apparently puts China in a difficult situation as they are allies. However, China is taking advantage of the international focus on North Korea, to quietly proceed with BRI.

In Southeast Asia, there is a clear divide, with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Malaysia quite favourable to Chinese influence, while Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia quite sceptical of it. There has been considerable shift in Philippines’ and Myanmar’s relations with China, the former amending misgivings and the latter departing from China’s bandwagon. Thus, it has become difficult for Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to have a coherent response to BRI.

In South Asia, the regional power India is sceptical of BRI. On the other hand, Pakistan, the hostile neighbour of India and all-weather friend of China, has provided the strategic access of Persian Gulf and Africa to China through Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port. Because of this, China can bypass the chokepoint of Malacca Straits that Indian Navy can blockade in case of hostilities. The Karakoram Highway and the connecting roads to Gwadar (all part of CPEC) pass through PoK, which is a sovereign territory of India, illegally occupied by Pakistan. Hence, there is a clear divergence in the approaches of India and Pakistan towards BRI. Besides, China is utilising her vast economic power to influence other neighbours of India, like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, which we are unable to match. However, the civilisational bonds between India and these countries are so strong that it is not possible in the short-term to turn them hostile to our national interest. They also recognise the dangers of debt trap and Chinese hegemony, if they participate in BRI without cooperation with India. Nevertheless, India should not take the situation for granted, as Chinese influence on them is growing. Among the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries, besides Pakistan, only Maldives has adopted a unilateral approach, even abandoning democratic practices to imprison the entire opposition that supports good relations with India. On the other hand, Bhutan has maintained very cordial relations with India, despite lot of pressure from China, as evident from the cooperation between them in the 2017 Doklam Crisis.

In Central Asia, as Russian power is gradually declining, China is emerging as the preponderant power. The region forms a crucial part of BRI.

In West Asia, dominated by the US, with Russia playing important role in support of Iran, China has a low profile. BRI may help China to improve her position in the region.

In Africa, where the US and the EU are the most powerful actors, China is taking advantage of their agenda of democracy and human rights, to cut deals with authoritarian regimes that fear regime change and export of democracy by the US. China also has to counter Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, an India-Japan collaboration that provides a democratic alternative to BRI.

3. Economic growth: Economics is the driving force behind BRI. China has multiple challenges to her economic prosperity, one of the pillars of legitimacy of the Party-state. There is a serious regional imbalance in China’s growth story. The wealth is concentrated in the Eastern plain and coastal regions, which are both industrial and agricultural belts of China and ethnically Han Chinese. On the other hand, the Western region, consisting of mountains, plateaus and deserts, is minority-dominated, pastoral economy. BRI is an opportunity for China to link its Western region to neighbouring countries and provide avenues of employment and income, infrastructure development and national integration in the Western region.

Chinese economic growth rate has been slowing down over the last few years, as the demand for more goods is declining in the global market and foreign manufacturers are shifting their bases to other low cost countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh. Domestic consumption has not increased fast enough in China and many industries, e.g. cement, steel, automobile and railways, suffer from overproduction. BRI provides impetus for growth by providing new markets to Chinese industries, paid for by Chinese investments, also providing business for Chinese banks and institutional investors. Moreover, Chinese managers, engineers and skilled workers go abroad for BRI projects, generating employment and income. Thus, BRI is vital for the next phase of China’s growth story.

4. Political stability: All the strategic and economic advantages derived from BRI, in the end, strengthen the Communist Party-state in China, especially the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has emerged as the most powerful leader of China after Mao Zedong, as he shifted the polity from collective leadership system established by Deng Xiaoping to his personal leadership of all national policy institutions. BRI bolsters his image as a strong leader with international influence and the architect of China’s 21^st century.

References

Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995), Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Katzenstein, Peter, ed. (2012), Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West, New York: Routledge.

Kissinger, Henry (2011), On China, New York: Penguin.

Pillsbury, Michael (2000), China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press.

Shue, Vivienne (2004), “Legitimacy Crisis in China?” in Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and Society in 21^st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation, New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

 

China's Soft Power Strategy

 Saurav Sarmah

Based on the lecture “China’s Soft Power Strategy” presented in Forum for Integrated National Security (FINS) Thinker’s Meet on Power of Soft Power held on 22 November 2015 at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat.

Published as “China’s Soft Power Strategy”, FINS Bulletin, Mumbai, 4 January 2016.

https://finsindia.org/chinas-soft-power-strategy/

(Re-published) FINS Journal of Strategy and Diplomacy, 13 February 2019, 2 (2). ISSN 2581-6586.

https://finsindia.org/journal/belt-and-road-initiative-a-civilisation-perspective-part-1/

Definition of soft power

The concept of ‘soft power’ was introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990, but as a form of power, it has existed since the dawn of human history. Both hard power and soft power have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers. At the outset, we must distinguish between hard power and soft power. Hard power coincides with the classical definition of power given by Robert Dahl (1957), viz. the ability to make others do what they would otherwise not do. In such a power relation, the initial preference of an unwilling victim has to be transformed by application of one of the four means – coercion, threat of force, economic sanctions or payment of money. However, if a nation has the ability to make another nation want what it wants, i.e. the latter willingly serves the former’s interest; the power relation is called soft power. Soft power can be understood in four categories – persuasion, legitimisation, socialisation and truth-claim (Digeser 1992; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Nye 2011).

Before explaining the categories, we must clarify that certain things are misunderstood as soft power, viz. weak foreign policy, cultural products and propaganda. Soft power is an instrument of strong and assertive nations. US, UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Russia, India, China and Japan are leaders in soft power, not Peru, Greece, Egypt, Bhutan or Cambodia, although the latter also have rich civilisational heritages. Softness, unsupported by hard power, exposes a nation to foreign invasion or economic pressure. India was attractive to foreigners hundreds of years ago, but it was weak and disunited, so got enslaved. In the 19^th century, China was a great civilisation; still it had to bend on its knees against the British opium traders and gunboats. However, when hard power is indiscriminately and unjustly applied, then soft power gets eroded, e.g. US invasion of Iraq, Israeli settlements in West Bank or China’s assertiveness in South China Sea.

As far as cultural products are concerned, someone may enjoy Chinese food but hate China or watch Bollywood and hate India. Anti-globalisation activists wear Nike shoes, drink Coke and use IPhones in protests against MNCs. Thus, cultural products are ineffective unless they turn into deep-rooted cultural habits or cultural obsession to wield any power.

Finally, soft power is not propaganda. During the Cold War, the communist countries allowed the screening of Hollywood films that were critical of the Vietnam War or exposed corruption in American political institutions, so that democracy and capitalism get discredited. But instead, the public admired the US for the freedom to criticise their government. Similarly, Bollywood films, 3Idiots and PK, have attracted the Chinese as the latter enjoy no right to satirise China’s customs or institutions.

Four Categories of Soft Power

Persuasion	Legitimisation	Socialisation	Truth-claim
1. Inter-state and Tactical	1. Supra-state and Strategic	1. Trans-state and Structural	1. Post-state and Post-structural
2. Decision-making	2. Agenda setting	2. Preference framing	2. Knowledge production
3. (a) Traditional diplomacy (b) Moral-charismatic influence	3. (a) Norms (b) Institutions that are internationally recognised	3. (a) Public diplomacy (b) MNCs (c) NGOs (d) Cultural habits	3. (a) Religion (b) Universities-Think tanks (c) News-Entertainment
4. Influence the behaviour of other governments	4. Make alternative preferences appear illegitimate or unfeasible	4. Mould the preferences of other societies to suit one’s own interests	4. Control the production and distribution of truth
e.g. Vatican’s role in Cuba-US rapprochement	e. g. UDHR, NPT. UN, IMF-World Bank, NATO, EU, G7, WTO	e.g. Ford Foundation, Greenpeace, Coke, McDonald's, Olympics	e.g. Christianity, Oxbridge, Ivy League, Hollywood, Pop music

Persuasion: Foreign governments can be convinced to adopt certain policies or positions through traditional diplomacy and moral or charismatic influence. It is possible only when lot of goodwill prevails between the involved actors. For instance, recently, the Vatican prevailed upon the United States and Cuba to exchange diplomatic missions after half a century of hostilities. In recent times, charismatic leaders like Nelson Mandela and Hugo Chavez used to enjoy lot of influence in their respective continents. But more often persuasion involves the backing of hard power.

Legitimisation: After the World War II, under the leadership of the United States, several international norms and institutions were established that have made any action in contravention appear illegitimate or unfeasible. Human rights and nuclear non-proliferation have been two norms, which if violated, could lead to economic sanctions and even military invasion, despite the legal sovereignty of a nation. Only if a nation has sufficient hard power, it can resist the dominance of norms and institutions and even forge together alternative platforms. China successfully resisted international sanctions after the Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989), India after the Pokhran II nuclear explosions (1998) and Russia after the annexation of Crimea (2014). They have also formed institutions like BRICS to resist American dominance.

Socialisation: Power can be more effective when a nation has the capacity to mould the preferences of prominent individuals, communities and public opinion within other nations to suit its own interests. Resourceful countries invest heavily in public diplomacy initiatives like funding foreign scholars and field studies abroad, e.g. Ford Foundation and Fulbright Program grants and organising sports, entertainment and business events, e.g. Olympics, Cannes Film Festival and World Expo. The non-governmental institutions also influence public opinion through advertisements and campaigns for moral causes, e.g. Greenpeace. Moreover, through consumption of foreign products, a public becomes gradually habituated to them and they become an integral part of the society; for instance, the recent ban on Maggi produced panic among the Indian middle class, especially students.

Truth-claim: The control over the production and distribution of knowledge has been the most powerful tool of hegemony throughout history. For thousands of years, religion has claimed access to metaphysical truths that are inaccessible to the ignorant masses. Elaborate doctrines and rituals have been developed to preserve its pre-eminent status as the only path to the Absolute Truth. Then, individual thinkers during the Enlightenment challenged the dominance of religion and pioneered secular sciences, theories and ideologies and that knowledge is preserved, distributed and updated in contemporary universities and think tanks. Eventually, since the 20^th century, news and entertainment have become the most popular media of dissemination of new ideas. Newspapers, cinema, television and now internet are the main sources of public information. A nation that controls religion, education and research and mass media has the power to determine the truth, i.e. the way we think and thus determine the course of history.

China’s Grand Narrative

The above discussion directly pertains to the strategic thinking within China. The Communist Party-state, unlike democracies where mandate of the people is the source of legitimacy, is based on claim to uphold the truth. Indeed, since ancient times, every dynasty or party ruling China has claimed to represent the Mandate of Heaven. The grand narrative is that China was once great, there was peace and prosperity in the realm, then the Europeans and the Japanese came with gunboats and ruthless mercantilism and pushed China into a Century of Humiliation. After tremendous sacrifice China achieved liberation under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong and the Communist Party and from 1978, China has been on the path to regain its status of the greatest power on earth. Of course, there are many inconvenient facts that are pushed under the rug in the grand narrative, for instance, the genocides committed by Mao or the persecution of minorities like Tibetans, Uyghurs and practitioners of Falun Gong.

Claims

Silence

1. Civilisational greatness (4000 years)         ·        Middle Kingdom – peace and harmony, instead of hegemony         ·        Zheng He’s voyages – trade and diplomacy, instead of colonialism         ·        Confucian philosophy – rationalism and benevolence, instead of superstition and genocide   2. Century of humiliation (1839-1949)         ·        Europeans and Japanese used opium, gunboats, racism and war to harass and loot China   3. The liberation of China by the Communist Party led by Mao Zedong in 1949   4. Since 1978, reform and opening – 37 years of peaceful economic development, good neighbourliness and multilateralism

1. Mao’s genocides   2. Support to communist and ethnic insurgencies abroad   3. Chinese invasions of India (1962) and Vietnam (1979)   4. 3Ts – Taiwanese independence, Tibetan resistance and Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989)   5. 3 Evils – Dalai Lama, Chen Shui-bian (2000-08) and East Turkestan Independence Movement   6. Suppression of alternative truth-claims – Falun Gong, liberalism, Christianity, Islam, etc.   7. No democracy or  human rights

The narrative identifies two threats to the domestic legitimacy of the Communist Party, by implication to the rise of China, firstly, democratic revolution, i.e. scenarios like the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests or the recent Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong and secondly, alternative truth-claims like liberalism, Falun Gong, Islam or Christianity, as these ideologies and cults also have their own exclusive grand narratives. In the international sphere, China is concerned about two IR theories – threat theory and collapse theory. The threat theory compares China to pre-World War I Germany and states that a rising China would be a danger to regional stability, as it would want to destabilise the hegemonic peace enforced by the US in the Asia-Pacific and seek its own dominance in the region. The other, collapse theory states that China’s rise is unsustainable as it lacks vibrant features of democracy and capitalism, personal freedom, rule of law and property rights that provide stability to the Western countries and so, China would eventually fall apart like the Soviet Union. To counter these threats to its domestic legitimacy and international image, the Party-state projects its achievements of liberation and economic development and its commitment to peace, harmony, trade, diplomacy, benevolence and rationalism in the world.

 

The Comprehensive Strategy

China like other countries conducts traditional diplomacy of bilateral and multilateral summits. Its negotiators are reputed to bargain very hard, quite often in a bureaucratic and mechanical way that involves threats or give and take, rather than gentle persuasion. However, there has been substantial attempt in the last decade or so to introduce more human emotions and display of camaraderie in summit meetings. Another important change has been the new confidence in working within a multilateral format that was completely lacking two decades ago. But perhaps, the most dramatic innovation by the current administration has been to introduce the charm and informality of the First Lady to diplomacy. Peng Liyuan used to be a popular military singer. She is photogenic and fashionable. She is an important asset to soften up China’s image abroad and also generate a feeling of pride at home.

China has held two norms paramount in its international diplomacy – first, one China policy, i.e. there is only one China, the Communist China and Taiwan is a province that will eventually be reunified and second, no foreign country should interfere in the domestic affairs of another country, an effective counter to the export of democracy and human rights agenda of the US. Both the positions have been quite successful. In 1971, major countries like the United States, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Australia had voted against China’s membership of the United Nation. As of today, except 22 tiny countries, mostly in Central America and the Pacific, every nation recognises the People’s Republic of China and its one China policy. Initially, China’s strategy was to join existing international organisations like the United Nations in 1971 and the World Trade Organization in 2001 as China wanted to be recognised as a mainstream nation. Now, it is pursuing a rigorous policy of establishing alternative organisations to counter American hegemony. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a counterpart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and BRICS of the G7. But nothing can compare to the establishment of two banks in 2015 – New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, challenging the dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions and the Asian Development Bank. These banks will be big game-changers along with ambitious projects like One Belt One Road and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The paramount leader of China from 1978, Deng Xiaoping had advised his successors ‘to keep a low profile’ or ‘hide your capabilities, bide your time’. They had followed his advice, but by 2008, they felt that China’s moment had arrived. China launched two mega-events that showcased its history, culture, wealth, technological and physical prowess – Beijing Olympics (2008) and Shanghai World Expo (2010). There is no doubt that China’s engagement with the world has been successful, we can see that from the rising number of tourists visiting China and also the number of Chinese travelling abroad. China’s traditional culture already has lot of consumers worldwide, whether it is China towns in Western metropolis, Chinese food, Feng Shui, Acupuncture or Shaolin Kung Fu. However, China has been weak in contemporary icons and brands. Only Huawei mobile phone and Alibaba e-retailing brands have global name recognition. However, the founder of Alibaba, Jack Ma has really turned into something of an international phenomenon.

I had recounted earlier the importance of production and distribution of knowledge to soft power. China has a comprehensive strategy to control the three things that control the human mind – religion, education and media. In the last decade, the Communist Party has tried to revive Confucianism to stop the excesses of wealth accumulation. Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, is the holiest place for the Chinese and it is receiving more and more visitors. The Hu Jintao administration was so obsessed with Confucius that in 2011, it set up a statue of Confucius at the Tiananmen Square opposite the huge portrait of Mao Zedong. But after warnings by Maoist ideologues, the statue disappeared overnight.

China believes that it can benefit from the soft power of Buddhism, so it holds World Buddhist Forum every three years. The fourth Forum took place in October 2015 at Wuxi, Jiangsu province. But China has an irritant in the form of the 14^th Dalai Lama. So, it is undermining his authority by propping up an 11^th Panchen Lama appointed by the Party-state, while the boy appointed by Dalai Lama as the real Panchen Lama has been in Chinese custody for a couple of decades, with no knowledge of his whereabouts or well-being. China has even passed an administrative order regulating the reincarnation of lamas in their territory and there are now thousands of China approved lamas who have reincarnated in Tibet. China also supports the worship of Dorje Shugden, who was declared an evil spirit by the Dalai Lama and so, the worshippers of the spirit despise the Dalai Lama. The religious minorities like the Falun Gong that are incompatible with the one official truth are out rightly banned and its followers persecuted. The conservative Muslims and Christian evangelists are also suppressed.

In education, Confucius Institutes are the biggest project to teach Chinese language, culture and official version of history to foreigners, in foreign university campuses. There is a massive concentration of Confucius Institutes in the United States and Western Europe. Another huge project is the partnership between the University of Washington and Tsinghua University to set up a Global Innovation Exchange in the Silicon Valley. It will be the first university established in collaboration with China outside of China. Meanwhile, both the Chinese students studying abroad and foreign students in China are increasing. The US has been the preferred destination for more than 300,000 Chinese students this year. The number of scientific research papers and patent applications continue to rise in China, but there is a question mark over their originality and quality.

Chinese film and music industry continues to grow, but there are serious issues about music piracy and lack of foreign audience for Chinese films. However, Chinese investors have now set their eyes upon Hollywood, which is welcoming of investment required for its no cost spared type of epic productions. With Chinese investments in Hollywood productions, the narratives will naturally portray China in a more complementary light. Besides films, China has also invested heavily in international news-entertainment business. The big four companies are China Central Television, China Radio International, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily newspaper.

On the one hand, China wants to enter the international media business; on the other, it prohibits and censors news coming from foreign media outlets. It maintains an internet blockade of many popular Western social media outlets, which is termed as the Great Firewall of China. It has two advantages – first, it prevents alternative and subversive narratives from entering the discourse in China and second, Chinese companies can build their own social networks and thus profit from the huge market.

Conclusion

1. China needs soft power for both domestic legitimacy and international image.

2. China has both offensive and defensive soft power strategies.

3. Although having many inherent deficiencies, China continues to innovate and find new ways to play the soft power game.

 

References

Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (2005), “Power in global governance” in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.) Power in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1957), “The Concept of Power”, Behavioural Science, 2 (3): 201-215.

Digeser, Peter (1992), “The Fourth Face of Power”, The Journal of Politics, 54 (4): 977-1007.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (1990), “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, (80): 153-171.

---- (2011), The Future of Power, New York: PublicAffairs.

 

2018 SCO Summit at Qingdao: An Indian Perspective

First published as “2018 SCO Summit at Qingdao: An Indian Perspective”, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi, 15 June 2018. 
https://sspconline.org/opinion/2018-sco-summit-qingdao-indian-perspective-fri-06152018-1200

Saurav Sarmah

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) grew out of the Shanghai Five, a grouping of China and its post-Soviet neighbours (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) formed in 1996, in order to reduce tensions along the approx. 7264 km long border. In 2001, when the formation of SCO was announced, the geopolitical situation had changed, as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded eastwards, incorporating former Soviet allies of the Warsaw Pact and used military force in former Yugoslavia, in the name of ‘humanitarian intervention’, despite opposition of Russia and China. Since then, SCO has functioned as a counterweight to NATO in the Eurasian region, including security, counterterrorism, energy and economic issues in its agenda. It has also expanded, with India and Pakistan as full members in 2017 (Uzbekistan was founding member in 2001) and four other countries (Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan and Belarus) as observers.

The 18^th meeting of SCO was held at Qingdao, Shandong, China on 9-10 June this year (2018). After the inauguration of the new United States (US) administration of President Donald Trump in 2017, the commitment of US to the ‘liberal international order’ seems uncertain. The foreign policy seems to be unpredictable, contradictory and incomprehensible, worrying friends as well as adversaries. The SCO meeting assumes lot of significance in this context, because one of the goals of SCO is to establish a multipolar international order, for which weakening of ‘American hegemony’ on security alliances, international economic institutions and other hard and soft power resources is necessary. SCO can take advantage of Trump’s policies by developing partnerships with estranged US allies and gaining leverage on many important issues.

The position of India, a new member, is peculiar. On one hand, India has a broad consensus with Russia and China on the multipolar international order, trade and environment policies, non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states by outside powers and independent foreign policy. On the other hand, India has strong relations with US and allies for balance of power in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ against a rising China. Besides, India also has bilateral disputes with China on border, trade deficit and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that violates India’s sovereign territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The dispute over CPEC was on full display at Qingdao, as India refused to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which CPEC is a part, in the joint declaration, which all other SCO members did. On the issue of terrorism also, India has issues with China, since Pakistan, the closest strategic ally and ‘all-weather friend’ of China, harbours, trains and funds terrorists operating in India, especially within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. China refuses to criticise Pakistan. Instead, it considers the peaceful and democratic Tibetan refugees and their spiritual leader Dalai Lama as one of the practitioners of the ‘three evils’ and pressurises India to restrict their activities in India.[i]

Despite these disagreements between China and India, the SCO Summit has achieved success on a number of issues. The Qingdao Declaration approved ‘A Plan of Action for 2018-2022 to implement the Treaty on Long-Term Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between SCO Member States’.[ii] It also advocated ‘settlement of crises in Afghanistan, Syria, the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula’ according to international law and ‘implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme’.[iii] There is a clear departure from the US position, especially in Syria and Iran. Even India has common strategic interests with Iran, on supply of energy resources, development of the Chabahar Port and linking it with Afghanistan and Central Asia, North-South Transport Corridor, linking Mumbai and St. Petersburg and opposition to Taliban in Afghanistan. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal provides an opportunity for SCO to find common ground with the European Union (EU). It will be in India’s advantage if sanctions are lifted against Iran.

On security and counterterrorism, the Qingdao Declaration reiterated SCO’s commitment to combating ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’, strengthening Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and support for UN Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism and Code of Conduct to Achieve a World Free of Terrorism. India could not get anything specific on cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan, which is unlikely from SCO now that Pakistan is also a full member. It will be interesting to see in future how SCO deals with separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir with both India and Pakistan as members. It will be an opportunity for India to get support from SCO on Jammu and Kashmir, based on the latter’s definition of ‘three evils’ as terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Besides, there were many agreements related to trade, environment, health, education and other socioeconomic issues, including a desire for cooperation to establish Development Bank of the SCO and the SCO Development Fund. Already, with the leadership of China and participation of both India and Russia, two banks, New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), have been established. SCO bank would further strengthen the alternative economic mechanism against Bretton Woods Institutions, led by US. Only on BRI, India has dissented as it violates India’s territorial integrity in Jammu and Kashmir. The CPEC part of BRI violates SCO’s own principle against ‘any act intended to violate territorial integrity of a State including by annexation of any part of its territory’.[iv]

Thus, it will be wise on the part of China to respect India’s territorial integrity in Jammu and Kashmir and also contain Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism, ensuring India’s support for China’s leadership in regional organisations, such as SCO and BRICS and participation in BRI. India, based on its strategic interests, needs to maintain balanced relations with the great powers, US, China and Russia and not commit to any power bloc. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s diplomacy has been deft, maintaining friendly relations with the great powers and working together on areas of mutual interest, without compromising India’s commitment to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and fight against terrorism.

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[i] Three evils, according to SCO, are terrorism, separatism and extremism.

[ii] Information Report following the Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Member States (Qingdao, 9-10 June 2018).

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Article 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (15 June 2001).