Introduction
China and India are two
ancient, continuous civilisations. They survived the onslaughts of invaders
through the last millennium and although imperialism ravaged and impoverished
them, they ‘stood up’ again in the 1940s. They experimented with imported economic
models of Marxism and Fabian socialism respectively for a considerable period,
but have emerged as important economic powers in the 21st century,
after unleashing the entrepreneurial genius of their people. China got a head
start over India as she adopted ‘reform and opening up’ policy in 1978, while
India pursued liberalisation only from 1991. In 2018, China is the second
largest economy in the world with more than 11 trillion dollar Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), far ahead of India at approx. 2.25 trillion dollar. The new
wealth provides China with an opportunity, before India catches up, to
establish the predominance of her civilisation in Asia. Another divergence
between the two countries is that China adopted a totalitarian system of Communist
Party-state in 1949 and India became a parliamentary democracy in 1947. As a
result, China has been brutally efficient in implementation of her policies and
in crisis management, while India takes more time in building a political
consensus on any policy or crisis, accommodating diverse points of views.
After 1978, the Chinese
grand strategy has been a combination of ancient wisdom, old-style realpolitik
and mercantilism and authoritarian capitalism. The One Belt One Road (OBOR)
initiative is a new component of this grand strategy. It was announced by the
head of the Chinese Party-state, President Xi Jinping in 2013 and has emerged
as the biggest foreign policy project of China till date. It is inspired by the
ancient Eurasian trade route called by historians as Silk Road that connected
China, India, Persia and Rome and the maritime expeditions of Chinese Admiral
Zheng He between 1405 and 1433. Therefore, it has two dimensions: one
continental, Silk Road Economic
Belt and one maritime, 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. In 2016, OBOR was
renamed as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The first summit meeting of Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation was held on 14-15 May 2017, attended
by 30 heads of state and government.
BRI incorporates various existing infrastructure linkage projects of
China with other countries and it is not something that is being built from
scratch. The Belt consists of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, New Eurasian Land Bridge,
China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor and
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. China is investing in
roads and railways, oil and gas exploration and pipelines and port development,
e.g. Gwadar, Pakistan. The Road includes strategic and commercial activities in
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean as well as Polar Silk Road in
partnership with Russia to explore the Arctic Sea. These large projects,
requiring hundreds of billions of dollars, are supported by newly created
financial institutions like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and
Silk Road Fund, besides the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of
China.
China’s Grand Strategy
and Civilisational Ambitions
In the Chinese language, China is called中国 (Zhōngguó) or the Middle Kingdom. In civilisational terms, it means that
China is at the centre of the world, emphasising the superiority of Chinese
civilisation and centrality of nationalism to her domestic and foreign
policies, despite Marxist doctrines that consider civilisation and nationalism
as false consciousness. The ancient Sino-centric order, called天下 (Tiānxià) or All Under Heaven, divided the world into three parts – the
Middle Kingdom, the tributaries and the barbarians (Kissinger 2011). The
countries that accepted the superiority of the Chinese order by offering homage
and gifts to the Chinese emperor, also called the Son of Heaven, were given the
status of tributaries. They received benefits of trade and non-aggression from
China. However, the countries antagonistic to the Chinese order were considered
serious threats by China and were termed as barbarians. Chinese military
strategies have always been oriented towards countering threats from the
barbarians (Johnston 1995). The Communist Party-state does not disown this
civilisational understanding of international relations (IR).
In the contemporary context, the discourse on hierarchical international
order based on civilisation seems politically incorrect. Nevertheless, mainstream
IR theory also contains terms such as unipolar moment, hegemonic stability,
regional hegemon, great powers and spheres of influence. Only difference is
that these terms denote superiority of military- economic hard power, not
civilisational soft power, while the Chinese concept of power, measured by
Comprehensive National Power (CNP), denotes hard as well as soft power
(Pillsbury 2000). The last four decades of China’s economic rise has not been devoid
of the civilisational or soft power element. It has been accompanied by the
Sinicisation process in Asia, i.e. increase of China’s ability to influence
other countries (Katzenstein 2012). Thus, emergence of China as the predominant
power in Asia does not only mean reordering of power structure but also
civilisational transformation from Westernisation to Sinicisation (Katzenstein
2012).
Besides the international dimension, China’s grand strategy also has a domestic
dimension, viz. continual economic growth and political stability, ensuring
legitimacy of the Party-state. Unlike democratic systems, in which legitimacy
of the government is based on periodic, free and fair elections and peaceful
transfer of power if the government is defeated, the Party-state system in
China gets its legitimacy from the awe and reverence of the people. Since
ancient times, the Chinese state has stood for certain virtues, viz. truth,
benevolence and glory, which legitimise its existence (Shue 2004). But whenever
the state has been unable to sustain these virtues, due to natural calamities,
foreign aggression or incompetence of the ruling dynasty, there have been
rebellions, which have led to end of the dynasty and emergence of new dynasties.
Ultimately one of them has succeeded in reuniting China. This concept is called
the Mandate of Heaven. ‘The
empire long united must divide, long divided must unite; this is how it has
always been’ (Romance of the Three Kingdoms).
If we envision a
civilisational continuity, we can say that the Communist Party is the latest
dynasty to unite and rule China. Parallels can be drawn between the ancient
virtues of truth, benevolence and glory
and the Communist Party-state’s emphasis on control over information, economic
growth and nationalism (Shue 2004). Firstly, like any totalitarian regime, the
Communist Party seeks to control the thought process of the citizens by
censorship, propaganda and education system. The majority of Chinese people do
not have access to information on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and the 1989
Tiananmen Square Massacre because there is heavy-handed censorship by the
Party-state on internet, press, TV, radio and any other means of communication.
Even a peaceful religious sect like the Falun Gong was banned in 1999 and its
followers persecuted, as any alternative version of truth is not allowed to
become too popular. Similarly, other religions are also restricted. Secondly, the
Chinese political system has been sustained by her unprecedented economic
growth that has brought abundance to the people, lifting hundreds of millions
out of poverty in a few decades. The stability of the Party-state regime
depends on its capability to ensure sustainable prosperity through employment
opportunities and rise in household incomes. Finally, the Communist Party has
to ensure the national glory of China as a great power, independent of any
foreign domination and with ability to influence other countries, especially in
the neighbourhood. In the nationalist discourse, the US and Japan are the
biggest external threats to China and separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet and
Xinjiang are the internal threats. The Party-state cannot compromise on these
threat perceptions due to popular sentiment, indeed has encouraged nationalist public
demonstrations against these threats.
Meanwhile, the head of the Party-state President Xi Jinping has
concentrated more and more power into his hands after he came to office in
2012-13. Recently, he has been reappointed as General Secretary of the
Communist Party in 2017 and President of China in 2018. The 1982 Constitution
of China has also been amended to remove the two-term limit on the President.
He also legitimises his preponderance through truth (anti-corruption campaign),
economic growth (above 6% GDP growth per annum) and nationalism (South China
Sea). The anti-corruption campaign has been used by Xi to weaken his rivals
from all three factions of the Communist Party, viz. Shanghai clique (led by
former President Jiang Zemin), Tuanpai or Communist Youth League faction (led
by former President Hu Jintao) and princelings (children of Communist Party veterans).
Xi Jinping himself is a princeling. Some important persons prosecuted for
corruption are Zhou Yongkang (former head of internal security under Jiang
Zemin), Ling Jihua (former chief political advisor to Hu Jintao) and Bo Xilai
(a popular princeling and former Party secretary of Chongqing). Through his
campaign, Xi has tried to legitimise his rule as a custodian of truth and
emerged as the paramount leader of China.
Thus, the multifaceted nature of China’s grand strategy can be understood
to be a combination of international and domestic dimensions and economic and
political considerations.
Multiple dimensions of
BRI
1. International order: Through BRI, China intends to gain strategic
foothold in all parts of Eurasia and Africa. She has built massive
infrastructural assets in many countries. Chinese companies, technicians and
workers have strong presence in these countries, as more and more projects are
contracted to China. Some countries, e.g. Sri Lanka in Hambantota port
development project, have fallen into debt trap, unable to repay China on her
investments and have had to lease their assets to China. In this way, China is
emerging as the predominant economic player in most countries of Eurasia and
Africa, replacing the United States, European Union, Japan or India. China is
already ahead of others, as a manufacturing hub and exporter, but BRI will
allow her to become also the predominant investor and eventually banker of the
world. As China becomes the centre of the world economy, through Sinicisation
process, the global narrative can be changed to favour Chinese values. With
China replacing others as the leading economy in the region, the narrative on
democracy and human rights would be supplanted by that on the superiority of
authoritarian capitalism, especially in many small, developing countries. It
would be a modern Sino-centric international order.
2. Regional influence: Since ancient times, China has developed policies
on her neighbourhood based on the tributary-barbarian dichotomy. Applying the
dichotomy in context of the responses to BRI, we can understand China’s
influence in different regions. In Northeast Asia, despite very close economic
engagement, China does not have much leverage due to strong regional powers –
Japan and South Korea, her relations with them turn sour from time to time due
to territorial disputes or legacy of World War II with the former and North
Korea with both. North Korea has assumed a posture of intractability, with her
nuclear weapons programme and nuclear and missile testing, which apparently
puts China in a difficult situation as they are allies. However, China is
taking advantage of the international focus on North Korea, to quietly proceed
with BRI.
In Southeast Asia, there is a clear divide, with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Malaysia quite favourable to Chinese influence, while Vietnam, Singapore
and Indonesia quite sceptical of it. There has been considerable shift in
Philippines’ and Myanmar’s relations with China, the former amending misgivings
and the latter departing from China’s bandwagon. Thus, it has become difficult
for Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to have a coherent response
to BRI.
In South Asia, the regional power India is sceptical of BRI. On the other
hand, Pakistan, the hostile neighbour of India and all-weather friend of China,
has provided the strategic access of Persian Gulf and Africa to China through
Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port. Because of this, China can bypass the
chokepoint of Malacca Straits that Indian Navy can blockade in case of
hostilities. The Karakoram Highway and the connecting roads to Gwadar (all part
of CPEC) pass through PoK, which is a sovereign territory of India, illegally
occupied by Pakistan. Hence, there is a clear divergence in the approaches of
India and Pakistan towards BRI. Besides, China is utilising her vast economic
power to influence other neighbours of India, like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
and Afghanistan, which we are unable to match. However, the civilisational
bonds between India and these countries are so strong that it is not possible
in the short-term to turn them hostile to our national interest. They also recognise
the dangers of debt trap and Chinese hegemony, if they participate in BRI
without cooperation with India. Nevertheless, India should not take the
situation for granted, as Chinese influence on them is growing. Among the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries, besides Pakistan,
only Maldives has adopted a unilateral approach, even abandoning democratic
practices to imprison the entire opposition that supports good relations with
India. On the other hand, Bhutan has maintained very cordial relations with
India, despite lot of pressure from China, as evident from the cooperation
between them in the 2017 Doklam Crisis.
In Central Asia, as Russian power is gradually
declining, China is emerging as the preponderant power. The region forms a
crucial part of BRI.
In West Asia, dominated by the US, with Russia
playing important role in support of Iran, China has a low profile. BRI may
help China to improve her position in the region.
In Africa, where the US and the EU are the most powerful actors, China is
taking advantage of their agenda of democracy and human rights, to cut deals
with authoritarian regimes that fear regime change and export of democracy by
the US. China also has to counter Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, an India-Japan
collaboration that provides a democratic alternative to BRI.
3. Economic growth: Economics is the driving force behind BRI. China
has multiple challenges to her economic prosperity, one of the pillars of legitimacy
of the Party-state. There is a serious regional imbalance in China’s growth
story. The wealth is concentrated in the Eastern plain and coastal regions,
which are both industrial and agricultural belts of China and ethnically Han
Chinese. On the other hand, the Western region, consisting of mountains,
plateaus and deserts, is minority-dominated, pastoral economy. BRI is an
opportunity for China to link its Western region to neighbouring countries and
provide avenues of employment and income, infrastructure development and
national integration in the Western region.
Chinese economic growth rate has been slowing down
over the last few years, as the demand for more goods is declining in the
global market and foreign manufacturers are shifting their bases to other low
cost countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh. Domestic consumption has not
increased fast enough in China and many industries, e.g. cement, steel,
automobile and railways, suffer from overproduction. BRI provides impetus for
growth by providing new markets to Chinese industries, paid for by Chinese
investments, also providing business for Chinese banks and institutional
investors. Moreover, Chinese managers, engineers and skilled workers go abroad
for BRI projects, generating employment and income. Thus, BRI is vital for the
next phase of China’s growth story.
4. Political stability: All the strategic and economic advantages derived
from BRI, in the end, strengthen the Communist Party-state in China, especially
the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has emerged as the most
powerful leader of China after Mao Zedong, as he shifted the polity from
collective leadership system established by Deng Xiaoping to his personal
leadership of all national policy institutions. BRI bolsters his image as a
strong leader with international influence and the architect of China’s 21st
century.
References
Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995), Cultural
Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter, ed. (2012), Sinicization
and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West, New
York: Routledge.
Kissinger, Henry (2011), On China,
New York: Penguin.
Pillsbury, Michael (2000), China
Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington D.C.: National Defense
University Press.
Shue, Vivienne (2004), “Legitimacy Crisis in China?” in Peter Hays Gries
and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and
Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation,
New York: RoutledgeCurzon.