First Published as “A Report on the Indian Think
Tank Delegation to China, December 2015”, BRICS Institute Online, New Delhi, 11
February 2016.
An Indian think tank delegation was invited by the Embassy
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in India and hosted by the China
Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) to Beijing and Shanghai from 15 December to
22 December 2015. The delegation consisted of 28 participants from the
Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), Observer Research Foundation (ORF),
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Institute of Chinese Studies
(ICS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies (IPCS), Forum for Strategic Initiatives (FSI) and National Maritime Foundation
(NMF), headed by Brigadier Vinod Anand. Interactions were held with various
Chinese universities and think tanks – China Institute of International Studies
(CIIS), CFAU, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
Tsinghua University, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and
Fudan University along with meetings with senior officials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA), PRC.
The main themes of the discussions were the rise of China in
the Asia-Pacific region replacing the United States, its efforts to set up
multilateral mechanism of One Belt One Road (OBOR) for development of the
region and India’s concerns about the OBOR, especially the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China’s strategic objectives in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean region. There were also deliberations on China’s concerns about the
strategic partnership of India, Japan and the United States (US) and India’s
role in the South China Sea. Besides, a considerable time was spent on finding a
common ground on countering Islamic terrorism. The boundary dispute and other
contentious issues like Jammu and Kashmir, Tibet and transnational rivers found
place only as isolated remarks or queries.
Beijing
The Chinese participants led by Prof Ruan Zongze,
Vice-President of CIIS argued strongly that the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
was an initiative to undermine the emerging economies or the BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa) and so India should shed its hesitation
and join the OBOR that would benefit the entire Asia-Pacific region. He
believed that it would not serve India’s interests to negotiate a deal with the
US within the TPP framework. Instead, the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and
Myanmar) project of the OBOR would be more consistent with Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s Act East Policy and India’s strategic and economic objectives. The
Indian delegation replied that India has multiple concerns about OBOR and
unless China clarifies the objectives and the roadmap of OBOR, it will be very
difficult to commit to the China-led mechanism. As far as relations with the US
are concerned, India pursues an independent foreign policy, not centred on
China, just as China has its separate relations with the US. Indeed, India also
is not enthused when concepts like G2 are proposed for a US-China dual
hegemony. Both sides, however, were positive about the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) of
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, China, South Korea,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. RCEP could be a counter-weight to TPP if it
gets finalised and approved by all the partners.
In CFAU, our delegation met Prof Qin Yaqin, President of
CFAU, after which we had a separate symposium on OBOR, Asian Connectivity and
Regional Integration. The Chinese side was led by Prof Wei Ling, Director of
Institute for Asian Studies, CFAU. Different aspects of OBOR and other regional
mechanisms like RCEP, Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) and South Asian
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) were discussed and the need for
greater co-operation was asserted by both sides. The Chinese side justified the
lack of clarity on OBOR as a policy of ‘crossing the river by groping the
stones’, i.e. according to the evolution of regional situation and interests,
OBOR would acquire its characteristics. Nevertheless, OBOR is intended to
promote connectivity and development of the Western region of China that,
unlike the Eastern region with access to open seas and rich neighbours,
requires state support for economic development. The Chinese side also argued that
there are many non-traditional security challenges like climate change and
terrorism requiring co-operation and partnership among all countries in the
region. Moreover, there is diffusion of power and interdependence in a
globalised world order, rendering the concepts of multipolarity and balance of
power redundant. So, the American rebalancing strategy (previously, Pivot to
Asia) is impractical, India should shed its scepticism and become a partner in
OBOR. When the Indian side raised concerns about common terrorist threat to
India and China from Islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the reluctance
of China to criticise Pakistan and resolve the boundary dispute with India, the
Chinese side held that Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism and China cannot
jeopardise its ‘all-weather friendship’ for some minor terrorist incidents and
advised India to resolve its disputes with Pakistan through dialogue. It also
termed the boundary dispute with India as a minor issue hyped by the Indian media.
Prof Su Hao (CFAU) was also present in the symposium. He proposed three levels
of engagement between China and India – multilateral, triangular and two plus
one. The multilateral engagement includes regional organisations such as RCEP,
SCO and SAARC. The triangular engagement involves partnership of both China and
India with another country. For instance, Japan invests both in China and India
and that is a win-win-win situation. China should not perceive Japan-India
partnership as a threat; instead compete with Japan for business opportunities
in India. The two plus one engagement means that both countries should have
joint foreign policies in neighbouring countries like Nepal, Myanmar and Afghanistan,
where China and India have common interests, to avoid misunderstanding and
unhealthy competition.
In CICIR, we had a symposium with a Chinese delegation led
by Dr Wang Shida, the Vice Director of Institute of South Asian, Southeast
Asian and Oceanic Studies, CICIR on Political and Security Situations in South
Asia and Sino-Indian Relations. Discussions centred around the scope for
increasing soft power co-operation through people to people contacts, joint
film projects and media coverage of each other. The Chinese side enumerated the
main problems as the lack of progress in the resolution of the border dispute,
military capacity building in the border areas, India’s conflict with Pakistan,
strategic partnership of India, US and Japan and India’s activities in the
South China Sea. The Indian side emphasised that as far as India-China
relations are concerned, there has been lot of progress in trade,
multilateralism and culture, but there is serious mistrust in border dispute,
military deployment in the border areas, China-Pakistan relations, especially
the CPEC related activities in the disputed territory of Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK) and military and nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan and
China’s reluctance to criticise cross border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.
On the South China Sea, the Indian side clarified that 55 per cent of India’s
trade passes through the area and hence India has interests in the freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea. On China’s perception of the constitutional
crisis in Nepal, the Chinese side replied that China has three principles – non-interference
in the domestic affairs, management of Tibetan political activities and
economic support.
Prof Yan Xuetong, the Dean of the Institute of Modern
International Relations, Tsinghua University explained that they have developed
a Tsinghua Approach to International Relations (IR), applying ancient Chinese
thought, modern IR theory, scientific methodology and the experience of China’s
rise. The central puzzle is that although China is deficient in comparison to
the US due to democracy deficit, economic imbalance and military weakness, how China
has reduced the power gap with the US in the last 10-15 years. To solve the
puzzle, the IR scholars at Tsinghua have developed the theory of Moral Realism.
Morality means the national political leadership should be responsible,
reliable and goal-oriented, learning from the national conditions, not borrowing
ideas from the hegemon. In the last 10-15 years, China has had the moral
leadership of the Communist Party that has both strength and good ideas, but
the US has suffered from inconsistent leadership, with President George W. Bush
who was strong, but had bad ideas and President Barack H. Obama who has good
ideas, but is weak. That is a contrast from the strong and smart leadership of
President Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Realism means the international power
structure determines the status of a nation and conflict among nations and
balance of power strategies are the unchangeable realities of international
politics. There is no final solution to conflict and power politics, only
conflict management to avoid full-scale wars. Thus, co-operation can only be
conditional and there can be no compromise on core interests, for instance
China would never accept the independence of Taiwan, the US would not allow
non-peaceful integration of Taiwan to China and so, the status quo is the only
way to avoid war.
Our delegation had representations from realist, liberal and
postmodern perspectives. From the realist perspective, the question was whether
India had to choose between American hegemony and Sinocentric order in
Asia-Pacific and what situation may emerge in the coming decades – strategic
balance, i.e. economic interdependence keeps political friction under control;
‘dragon fire’, i.e. the US returns to isolation and China prevails; or fragile
China, i.e. China’s economic downturn creates a power vacuum and India emerges
as a strategic balancer. The liberal argument was that the global governance institutions
have inherent deficiencies and biases originating in the 1944 Bretton Woods
Conference, where the Anglo-American strategists had entrenched their hegemony.
So, the important question is whether alternative institutions developed by the
emerging economies, e.g. New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) would be more inclusive and equitable or the same power
interests would prevail. The postmodern problem was that in the great power
politics between China and India, the minority communities residing in the
Himalayan Region get marginalised and their language and culture are on the
verge of extinction. Therefore, the enquiry was if the Tsinghua Approach had
any solution to such problems. Another issue was the possibility of India and
China working together to develop civilisational universalism based on the
teachings of Buddha, Confucius, Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. The
response of Prof Yan was that neither the isolation of the US nor the decline
of China was a possibility in the next decade. Hence, there would be bipolarity
in the Asia-Pacific. India should in its national interest revive non-alignment
and extract maximum benefits from both the US and China. It will not be
possible for India to emerge as a separate pole unless it gains a moral
leadership that can make it strong and rich, which is impossible as it has a
system of government not rooted in Indian conditions. On globalisation, Prof
Yan stated that it was a process of the rich, by the rich and for the rich and
the poor are incapable of resisting it, so they will remain marginalised and
the gap between rich and poor cannot be removed. On the emerging economies, he
said that BRICS is an unreal term because Russia and Brazil are shrinking
economies, India and South Africa have too many problems and it is not possible
for China to revive these economies or solve their problems. He predicted that
BRICS will cease to exist by 2023. On the Tsinghua Approach, he explained Moral
Realism and then mentioned that every country should develop its local IR
theory rooted in its traditions because country suffering from identity crisis
can never develop moral leadership. However, it is inefficient for great powers
to concentrate on marginal issues, so these issues will always be at the
periphery of international politics.
Shanghai
In Shanghai, there were two symposiums – one at SIIS on
World Counter-Terrorism Situation and Global Governance with the Chinese team
led by Prof Chen Dongxiao, President of SIIS and the other at Fudan University
on Asia Pacific Situations and Relations between China, US and India with Prof
Shen Dingli, Vice President of the School of International Studies, Fudan
University. In SIIS, Prof Zhao Gancheng, Director of the Center of Asia-Pacific
Studies spoke on counter-terrorism and stressed the need for India and China to
co-operate to tackle both the terrorist infrastructure and ideology. Prof Ye Jiang,
Director of the Institute for Global Governance Studies addressed the global
governance issues and how India and China could engage at various levels. The
Indian side also made presentations, which were followed by questions and
answers. In Fudan University, Prof Shen Dingli stressed the necessity of
changing the perception of Indians and Chinese towards one another. He admitted
that India was a great civilisation with 8000 years of antiquity, a
civilisation that has remained in the right side of history and to which China
owes a lot of debt. In that spirit of broad-mindedness, he advocated that China
should follow the Gujral Doctrine, i.e. China should unilaterally give
concessions to India, for instance in the boundary dispute and that would
generate tremendous goodwill for China in the hearts of Indians. China should
also endorse India’s relations with the US and Japan and use India’s good
offices to mend relations with them.
Thus, the visit gave our delegation insights into the
diverse foreign policy perspectives in China, helped us establish contacts with
important scholars in the foreign policy research community and contribute to
the dialogue process between India and China.
No comments:
Post a Comment